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O P I N I O N 
    
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Jeffrey Woronowicz challenges the 41-month term of 
imprisonment to which he was sentenced after pleading guilty 
to a one-count Indictment charging him with counterfeiting in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 474. Woronowicz urges that the 
District Court clearly erred in calculating the amount of 
counterfeit currency attributable to him under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and that his sentence is procedurally and 
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 In 2008, Woronowicz was convicted of four counts of 
willful failure to file tax returns and was sentenced to a 12-
month term of imprisonment with 1 year of supervised 
release. He failed to comply with the terms of his supervised 
release, resulting in an additional 3 months’ imprisonment. 
Woronowicz was allowed to self-surrender but failed to do 
so. After being arrested for failure to surrender, Woronowicz 
consented to have law enforcement officials search his 
residence. The officials discovered counterfeit currency with 
a face value in excess of $207,000. Approximately 90% of 
the bills found were completed on only one side, and $20,000 
worth were completed on both sides. Authorities also 
discovered materials used to manufacture counterfeit 
currency. Woronowicz subsequently pleaded guilty to the one 
count Indictment charging him with counterfeiting.  
 
 At sentencing, the District Court applied a 12-level 
enhancement to Woronowicz’s Guidelines range, pursuant to 
§ 2B5.1(b)(1)(B) based on its calculation of the face value of 
the counterfeit currency as exceeding $200,000.
2
 The Court 
rejected Woronowicz’s argument that he should receive no 
more than a 4-level enhancement since only 10% of the 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction over Woronowicz’s appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
2
 Section 2B5.1(b)(1)(B) instructs to use the table in § 2B1.1 
which indicates that for losses greater than $200,000, a 12-
level enhancement should be applied.  
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counterfeited notes were fully completed. The Court 
calculated Woronowicz’s total offense level as 20 and his 
criminal history category as IV, resulting in an advisory 
Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months. The Court varied 
downward, imposing a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment, 
acknowledging that the fact that many of the bills were 




 We review a District Court’s interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its application of the 
Guidelines to the facts for clear error. United States v. 
Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 218-20 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 
 Under § 2B5.1(b)(1)(B), the Court is to impose a 
sentencing level enhancement based on “the face value of the 
counterfeit items.” United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 
(3d Cir. 2011). Here, Woronowicz concedes that the face 
value of the currency was $207,980 but urges that incomplete 
bills should not be counted as “counterfeit items.” He also 
raises arguments regarding intended loss, but we have clearly 
held that intended loss is irrelevant in imposing an 
enhancement under § 2B5.1(b)(1)(B). Wright, 642 F.3d at 
154.
3
 Though we have never explicitly ruled on whether 
                                              
3
 Puzzlingly, Woronowicz cites our holding in Wright for the 
proposition that we have mandated “a conservative approach 
when ruling on sentencing enhancements.” Appellant’s Br. 
24. Even if this were true, a strict interpretation of § 
2B5.1(b)(1) would still include one-sided bills in the 
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incomplete bills should be counted in arriving at face value 
under § 2B5.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines, every other 
court of appeals that has addressed this question has held that 
they should. See United States v. Kelly, 204 F.3d 652, 657 
(6th Cir. 2000) (counting bills lacking seals and numbers 
under enhancement); United States v. Webster, 108 F.3d 
1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 1997) (counting uncut bills); United 
States v. Ramacci, 15 F.3d 75, 78 (7th Cir. 1994) (counting 
one-sided bills); United States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 512-




 Under § 2B5.1, a counterfeit item is defined as “an 
instrument that has been falsely made, manufactured, or 
altered.” U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1 cmt. n.1. Note 3 of § 2B5.1 
specifically excepts, “items that are so obviously counterfeit 
that they are unlikely to be accepted even if subjected to only 
minimal scrutiny,” Id. § 2B5.1 cmt. n.3, from being counted 
in connection with a different subsection of § 2B5.1(b) – 
namely (b)(2)(A). In United States v. Taftsiou, we held that 
the Sentencing Commission “unambiguously limited the 
reach of note [3]
5
 to subsection (b)(2)” and that we were “not 
at liberty to extend its application to other subsections by 
                                                                                                     
calculation of the face value of the counterfeit currency for 
the reasons explained herein.    
4
 Woronowicz points to United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982 
(5th Cir. 1998), as disagreeing with the Lamere decision. 
Cho, however, involved a completely different Guidelines 
section, and disagreed with Lamere on an issue irrelevant to 
the instant case—that is, whether a district court errs by 
considering the application notes accompanying a cross-
referenced Guideline. See Cho, 136 F.3d at 984 n.3.  
5
 At the time, the note in question was note 4.  
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judicial fiat alone.” 144 F.3d 287, 294 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Therefore, we held that notes of unpassable quality do count 
towards the face value of counterfeit items under subsection 
(b)(1). Id. Incomplete bills are merely notes that could be 
considered to be of unpassable quality. Therefore, extending 
our holding in Taftsiou, we now hold that incomplete bills are 
“counterfeit items” under § 2B5.1(b)(1) and must be counted 
in calculating the total face value.  
 
 Woronowicz’s argument that there are an “abundance 
of cases wherein convictions for counterfeiting were reversed 
because the counterfeit bills were not of passable quality,” is 
misplaced. Appellant’s Br. 15. First, the cases he relies on 
involved a different statute from the one at issue here—18 
U.S.C. § 472 rather than § 474. See United States v. Ross, 844 
F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 
827 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94 (4th 
Cir. 1963). Unlike § 472,    § 474, prohibits the possession of 
currency made “in whole or in part, after the similitude” of 
U.S. currency. See Ross, 844 F.2d at 190. Second, the cases 
he cites involved challenges to convictions, not challenges to 
sentences. Woronowicz’s sentencing range is determined by 
the Sentencing Guidelines, not by the underlying 
counterfeiting statute. Since the relevant Guideline provision 
bases the appropriate sentencing level enhancement on the 
face value of the counterfeit items, and since the face value 
here is $207,980, the District Court did not err in applying a 
12-level enhancement.  
B. 
 We review a sentence’s procedural and substantive 
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Woronowicz asserts that the District Court failed to 
meaningfully consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) and to adequately explain the reasons for its sentence. 
This assertion is belied by the record. The Court provided an 
in depth explanation for its sentence, noting, inter alia, 
Woronowicz’s criminal history, his refusal to comply with the 
law in spite of leniency previously afforded to him, the actual 
and potential danger posed to the community by his continued 
possession of the counterfeit bills, the high quality of the 
bills, and the fact that bills were passed in 2009, prior to his 
imprisonment. Contrary to Woronowicz’s assertion that the 
Court did not account for the fact that the counterfeit bills 
were one-sided, the Court explicitly noted that the amount of 
loss used to calculate the upward adjustment under the 
Guidelines “may somewhat overstate the actual or intended 
loss represented by [the] hoard of mostly incompleted [sic] 
printing jobs,” and the Court then varied downward two 
levels, giving Woronowicz a sentence at the bottom of the 
new Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The Court also 
credited Woronowicz’s argument that the currency was 
produced 31 years ago, but held that this was outweighed by 
the fact that it could have been used at any time in the interim 
by anyone who was able to gain possession of it.  
 
 Woronowicz raises several mitigation arguments for 
the first time on appeal. We review these for plain error. 
United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Woronowicz states that this was his first felony conviction, 
and that statistical data would suggest that persons over 50 
have a low risk of recidivism. This argument makes little 
sense, given that his history of criminal convictions began 
after the age of 50 and that he has a track record of failing to 
cooperate with law enforcement even after being shown 
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leniency. Woronowicz also argues that the District Court 
should have given him a lower sentence because of his youth 
at the time of the manufacture of the counterfeit currency. He 
acknowledges, however, that he was convicted of possession, 
and that possession is an ongoing offense. We conclude that 
the District Court did not commit plain error in imposing its 
sentence without specific consideration of these aspects of his 
life and crime.  
 
 Having determined that the District Court’s sentence 
was procedurally sound, we will affirm “unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
that particular defendant for the reasons . . . provided.” 
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Sentences within the Guidelines 
range are “more likely to be reasonable than those that fall 
outside this range.” United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 
245 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the District Court not only varied 
downward two levels to account for the unique circumstances 
of Woronowicz’s case, but also sentenced him at the bottom 
of the Guidelines range. Given the Court’s sound explanation 
of its reasons for sentencing Woronowicz to 41 months’ 






 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence.  
 
